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DISTRICT COURTS, FAIR USE, AND LITERARY PARODIES:
PARSING THE BEAUTIFUL, RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT
∗

Brigitte Radigan Gladis
Among other things, you’ll find that you’re not the first person
who was ever confused and frightened and even sickened by human behavior. You’re by no means alone on that score, you’ll be
excited and stimulated to know. Many, many men have been just
as troubled morally and spiritually as you are right now. Happily,
some of them kept records of their troubles. You’ll learn from
them—if you want to. Just as someday, if you have something to
offer, someone will learn something from you. It’s a beautiful, reciprocal arrangement. And it isn’t education. It’s history. It’s
1
poetry.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Authors have long sought to contribute to this “beautiful, reciprocal arrangement” by creating original works of scholarship, often
in response to other writers troubled by the same moral and spiritual
dilemmas. Copyright has somewhat complicated this arrangement by
deeming some references to another’s work to be violative of that author’s rights to his original. Congress has tried to strike a delicate
balance between the rights of an original author to his creation and
the right to contribute to the “marketplace of ideas” guaranteed to
2
the public by the First Amendment. To do so, it codified the judicial
fair use doctrine and vested district courts with the discretion to determine when uses have crossed the line from fair use to infringe3
ment. The lack of precision in where courts should draw the line,

∗

J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A., 2007, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2005, Rutgers University. I would like to thank Professor
David Opderbeck for his advice and Sarah Geers for her thoughtful remarks about
this Comment.
1
J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 246 (1951).
2
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”).
3
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (codifying the judicial doctrine of fair use).
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however, sometimes leads courts to prioritize one set of rights over
the other, resulting in uncertainty and unpredictability.
In the United States, the use of copyright to protect one’s economic interest in artistic creation derives from the British Statute of
Anne, which Parliament passed in 1710 to prevent publishers from
4
publishing books without the original author’s consent. The Statute
of Anne gave economic rights to authors of books, but it also limited
these rights by restricting the copyright to printing and reprinting
5
copies of that book. In addition, the term of the copyright was li6
mited to fourteen years. Following the Revolution, the fledgling
United States incorporated the limitations on copyright from the Sta7
tute of Anne in an early resolution of the Continental Congress and
later used this tradition in the formation of the United States Consti8
tution’s Copyright Clause.
Modern copyright protection in the United States is found in
the Copyright Act of 1976, specifically 17 U.S.C. § 102, which explicitly allows for copyrights over particular modes of expression, such as
4
See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp (“Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing . . . books and other writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their very great detriment . . . .”);
see also Tracey Topper Gonzales, Note, Distinguishing the Derivative from the Transformative: Expanding Market-Based Inquiries in Fair Use Adjudications, 21 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 229, 232 (2003).
5
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (stating that the title of the statute
is “[a]n act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed
books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned”).
6
Id. (“That the author of any book or books already composed, and not printed
and published, or that shall hereafter be composed, his assignee or assigns, shall
have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting such book and books for the term of
fourteen years, to commence from the day of first publishing the same, and no longer.”); see also Diane Kilpatrick-Lee, Criminal Copyright Law: Preventing a Clear Danger to
the U.S. Economy or Clearly Preventing the Original Purpose of Copyright Law?, 14 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 87, 91 (2005).
7
Journal of the United States in Congress Assembled, Containing the Proceedings from Nov. 1782 to Nov. 1783, at 256–57 (Philadelphia, C.D. Claypoole, 1783),
available
at
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/Resolution%
20of%20the%20Continental%20Congress%20Respecting%20Copyright.pdf (“That
it be recommended to the several States, to secure to the authors or publishers of any
new books not hitherto printed . . . the copyright of such books for a certain time not
less than fourteen years from the first publication . . . .”).
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that one of the powers of Congress is “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); see also Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Essay, Copyright in 1791: An Essay, 52
EMORY L.J. 909, 931–38 (2003).
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literary works, musical works, and visual works. The statute also vests
artists and authors with the right to reproduce their original work, as
10
well as the right to create derivative works from their originals. Ultimately, copyright protection serves to encourage artists and authors
11
to create original works for the benefit of the public welfare; allow12
ing them a monopoly over these creations incentivizes the process.
The protection, however, is statutorily limited; Congress specified
that protection extends only to “original works of authorship fixed in
13
any tangible medium of expression.” The statute further limits copyright protection by disallowing copyrights over “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov14
ery.” Thus, Congress emphasized the limited nature of copyright
protection by explicitly drawing a line between ideas and actual expression of those ideas.
The idea/expression dichotomy embodied in the statute ensures
some measure of First Amendment protection while still preserving
15
an author’s limited monopoly over his expression. Not all elements
of a given work will always be copyrightable; for this reason, whether
someone has infringed another’s copyright will first depend upon a
court’s characterization of an author’s or artist’s work as protectable
expression rather than merely an idea, which cannot generally be co16
pyrighted. Ultimately, the idea/expression dichotomy serves to prevent someone from “stifling public debate by maintaining a monopo-

9
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
10
Id. § 106.
11
See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”).
12
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright law, like the patent
statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); see also KilpatrickLee, supra note 6, at 94.
13
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
14
§ 102(b).
15
See Barbara S. Murphy, Comment, The Wind Done Gone: Parody or Piracy? A
Comment on Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 567,
573 (2002).
16
See Jonathan S. Katz, Expanded Notions of Copyright Protection: Idea Protection Within the Copyright Act, 77 B.U. L. REV. 873, 878–79 (1997).
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17

ly on historical fact or bare ideas.” Nevertheless, the boundary between what is just an idea and what constitutes copyrightable expression is a difficult one to fix with any precision. As Judge Learned
Hand once commented, “Nobody has ever been able to fix that
18
boundary, and nobody ever can.”
Thus, although the
idea/expression boundary is intended to protect important First
Amendment concerns, it is not always able to do so, nor does it create
19
clear guidelines for creators and producers to follow.
U.S. copyright law, as opposed to the law in many European
countries, is further limited in that U.S. law does not generally expli20
citly recognize an author’s moral rights to his creation.
“Moral
rights,” a doctrine originally established in France, embodies the idea
that an author possesses more than merely economic rights in his or
21
her creation. Such rights include “the right to prevent others from
being named as the author of his work” as well as “the right to pre22
vent others from making deforming changes in his work.”
The
Berne Convention, signed by several countries, codified these rights
more broadly to protect authors’ non-economic rights, primarily
23
rights to attribution and integrity. In the United States, explicit statutory protection of moral rights extends only to works of visual art
24
rather than to literary or musical works. Further, “Congress made
clear its antipathy to the expansion of copyright law to embrace gen17

Tiffany D. Trunko, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1949 (1989).
18
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
19
In cases of literary works, the idea/expression dichotomy becomes relevant in
a discussion of whether a character or storyline is copyrightable expression rather
than merely an idea. Generally, literary characters are considered copyrightable to
the extent that they are well developed in the fictional story in which they appear.
See id. (“It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for making them too indistinctly.”);
see also Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The
Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters,
44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
20
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of
action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than
the personal, rights of authors.”).
21
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01 (2009).
22
Id.
23
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/
berne/6bis.html.
24
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006). “Only the author
of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work, whether or not that author is the copyright owner.” Id. § 106A(b).
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25

eral moral rights.” The lack of explicit statutory protection for the
moral rights of authors underscores Congress’s protection of the
“marketplace of ideas” and furthers the progress of science and the
26
arts protected by the U.S. Constitution.
In addition to the idea/expression dichotomy and the general
lack of protection for moral rights, Congress has also limited copyright protection in its statutory embodiment of the judicially created
fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107. Section 107 allows for “infringement” of copyrights, so long as that infringement is for a legitimate
purpose. Legitimate purposes include, but are not limited to, “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
27
for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” To determine whether a work qualifies as fair use, courts apply four factors to the work in
28
question.
Courts first address “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprof29
it educational purposes.” This first factor tends to assess how trans30
formative a work is when compared to the original.
To be
considered transformative, “[t]he use must be productive and must
employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different
31
purpose from the original.”
The second factor courts consider in analyzing fair use is “the
32
nature of the copyrighted work.” This factor “recognizes that there
is a hierarchy of copyright protection in which original, creative
works are afforded greater protection than derivative works or factual
33
compilations.”
The third fair use factor assesses “the amount and substantiality
34
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”
35
This factor has both quantitative and qualitative elements. The ap25

3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, § 8D.06.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
28
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
29
§ 107(1).
30
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
31
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990).
32
§ 107(2).
33
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001);
see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (“In general, fair use is more likely
to be found in factual works than in fictional novels.”).
34
§ 107(3).
35
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05(A)(3).
26
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propriate quantity of material that may be taken ultimately depends
on the purpose the new work is intended to serve, while the quality of
the material that is used relates to whether the new work appropriates
the “heart of the work,” or material that may interfere with the mar36
ket of the original.
Finally, under the fourth factor, courts consider “the effect of
37
the use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work.”
“The fourth factor disfavors a finding of fair use only when the market is impaired because the quoted material serves the consumer as a
substitute, or, in [Justice] Story’s words ‘supersede[s] the use of the
38
original.’”
Once a court evaluates each individual factor, it will
weigh the factors to determine whether a use tips in favor of or
39
against fair use.
Although the four factors apply in every case in which a court
analyzes fair use, the subjectivity built into the test allows judges the
discretion to look at each case individually rather than to rely on
40
bright-line rules. Because the fair use doctrine is “an equitable rule
of reason,” Congress did not want to solidify a definition that could
be applied to all situations; instead, Congress included in the statute
41
criteria that had evolved over time through judicial decisions. Further, Congress made clear that codifying the fair use factors did not
serve to change, narrow, or enlarge the previous judicial doctrine and
that the factors are illustrative, not exhaustive, of what courts should
42
consider. In codifying this fair use doctrine, Congress emphasized
that “the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situa43
tions on a case-by-case basis.” Additionally, the fundamental purpose of copyright is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex44
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The fair

36

Leval, supra note 31, at 1122–23.
§ 107(4).
38
Leval, supra note 31, at 1125 (quoting Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
39
See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
40
See Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 591 (2002).
41
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
42
Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1168
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
43
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
44
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37
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use doctrine furthers this goal by allowing authors and artists to trans45
form existing works for some creative, original purpose.
Justice Story once stated,
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art,
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was
46
well known and used before.

This Comment will address district courts’ application of the four fair
use factors to asserted cases of parody, most specifically in the context
of parodic sequels to literary novels, to determine whether these
court decisions adequately protect the First Amendment rights of the
authors of these sequels.
Part II of this Comment discusses how courts have applied the
fair use factors to parody in various forms of media and confronts the
differences in analysis that may result depending upon which mode
of expression is being studied. Part III discusses the different types of
relief afforded depending on the form of expression the parody
takes. Parts IV and V analyze two recent district court decisions that
involved parodic sequels and discuss how the courts applied the fair
use factors to reach their decisions about injunctive relief. Finally,
Part VI discusses several possible solutions to the problem of “arbitrary” district court application of the fair use factors in this context.
II. FAIR USE AND PARODIES IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF MEDIA
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
made explicit that parody could fall within the purview of the fair use
47
doctrine. In Campbell, the Court analyzed rap group 2 Live Crew’s
use of the title, opening bass riff, and one verse of Roy Orbison’s song
48
“Oh, Pretty Woman” in its own rap “parody.” The Court first determined that the factors outlined in the Copyright Act were not exhaustive and should be considered in terms of all of the facts of a particular case; the statute essentially creates “general guidance” to
courts, but courts are not limited to the examples listed in the sta49
tute. The Court next commented that the “goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation

45
46
47
48
49

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1994).
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994).
See Murphy, supra note 15, at 578.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
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50

of transformative works.”
For this reason, those who transform
another’s work through the use of parody are able to claim fair use,
51
much in the way others who comment and criticize do. Finally, the
Court cautioned that courts should be careful in applying factor four,
52
which considers the effect on the market for the copyrighted work.
Parodies will seldom become market substitutes for the original,
53
which is what factor four is designed to prevent. Factor four, therefore, should not be applied to consider the potential economic ef54
fects from a parody’s negative depiction of a given work.
Campbell thus created a broad standard for how district courts
should approach the fair use doctrine in the context of parody.
Therefore, in cases in which the creator of a derivative work is asserting a defense of fair use on the grounds of parody, courts must, as a
55
threshold matter, determine whether such parody exists. Even if a
court finds the work to be a parody, a finding of fair use is not guaranteed; the court must then apply the other factors to determine
56
whether the balance tips in favor of or against fair use. In their analyses, courts will first attempt to distinguish between parody and satire; while parody requires some appropriation from another work to
be able to criticize or comment on it, a satire stands alone and does
not need to use another’s material in the same way that a parody
would because a satire comments on something unrelated to the orig57
inal. Thus, if a court determines a writing to be a satire rather than
a parody, the author will have less of a reason to appropriate work
from another source because his satire should be able to stand on its
own. To make this determination, a court will consider whether “a
58
parodic character may reasonably be perceived” in the new work; if
59
so, the court will consider it a parody.
Following Campbell, another difficulty courts face in discerning
parody is the inconsistent application of the term “parody.” The

50

Id. at 579.
Id.
52
Id. at 591.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 591–92 (“We do not, of course, suggest that a parody may not harm the
market at all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand
for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”).
55
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
56
Leval, supra note 31, at 1111.
57
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81.
58
Id. at 582.
59
Id.
51
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Campbell Court determined that for the purpose of the Copyright Act,
parody consists of “the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
60
author’s work.” Further, “a work [does] not have to advertise itself
as a parody” because the same creative goals would be served with or
61
without a label. Some confusion also lies in whether a parody is required to be humorous in making its point. A traditional definition
of parody is “a literary or musical work in which the style of an author
62
or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule.” But the
legal definition of parody makes no reference to humor; instead, as
Campbell makes clear, a work must merely comment on the original
through incorporation of material from the original to qualify as a
63
parody. This definition, however, has not prevented some courts
from assessing the level of humor found in a given work to determine
64
whether or not it should qualify for the fair use defense as a parody.
Since Campbell, the circuits have defined parody both narrowly
65
and broadly, reaching seemingly divergent results. For example, in
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
held that a book that used stylistic and artistic elements from Dr.
Seuss books to “parody” the O.J. Simpson murder trial did not constitute fair use because the author made “no effort to create a transfor66
mative work.” Although in this case “a parodic character may be

60

Id. at 580.
Jonathan M. Fox, The Fair Use Commercial Parody Defense and How to Improve It, 46
IDEA 619, 626 (2006).
62
Parody – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/parody (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
63
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580; see also Fox, supra note 61, at 619–20.
64
See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir.
2009) (“Although we recognize some humor in ‘Char’ bucks as a reference to the
dark roast of the Starbucks coffees, Black Bear’s claim of humor fails to demonstrate
such a clear parody as to qualify . . . .”); Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (“There are confusing parodies and nonconfusing parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor through the
use of someone else’s trademark.”); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“This stems from [the] fact that parody’s humor ‘necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object through
distorted imitation.’” (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588)); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1373 n.11 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“Parody is a term
that implies wit and humor, neither of which is in evidence here.”), rev’d, 268 F.3d
1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
65
See Fox, supra note 61, at 628–29.
66
109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does
broadly mimic Dr. Seuss’ characteristic style, it does not hold his style up to ridicule.”). But see Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998)
61
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reasonably perceived,” the court applied this standard narrowly and
67
rejected the defendant’s fair use defense. This case highlights that
the difficulty with applying the fair use factors to works with parodic
purposes, as opposed to those with scholarly or research purposes, is
that “judges can ‘manipulate’ the flexible statutory fair use factors to
effectively censor parodies ‘because they [find] them immoral or per68
sonally distasteful.’” Whether this “manipulation” is intentional may
be debatable, but the flexible standard does establish the basis for it
69
to occur.
The Campbell court, however, cautioned that
“[w]hether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does not and should
70
not matter to fair use.” This does not change the fact that, across
jurisdictions, would-be parodists cannot know what to expect because
court decisions are often unpredictable both in the way they draw the
parody/satire distinction and in their determination of whether the
parody can only comment on the original work or can use the origi71
nal to comment on a broader issue.
Courts also seem to differ in their interpretations of whether the
use of copyrighted material in parodying matters other than the copyrighted material can qualify as fair use. This question of scope may
arise if an author of a parodic sequel uses material from the original
work to comment not only on the work but also on an issue loosely
72
related to the work. In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting
Co., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that even if a parody “did not parody the plaintiff’s song itself,
73
that finding would not preclude a finding of fair use.” In Elsmere,
the court addressed Saturday Night Live’s (SNL’s) use of Elsmere’s
copyrighted song “I Love New York” in a parody entitled “I Love So(holding that because a movie poster that used material from a professional photograph could “reasonably be perceived as” a parody, it could be considered fair use).
67
Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403.
68
Murphy, supra note 15, at 578.
69
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05(A)(5)(a) (“Accordingly, courts
weigh the factors the way they deem best in individual cases. The result, unfortunately, is often that the four factors fail to drive the analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang antecedent conclusions.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
70
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994).
71
See Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard of
Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465, 474 (1992).
72
See infra Parts IV, V (discussing two cases of parodic sequels; one commented
on the original novel and the depiction of African-American slaves during the Reconstruction era, and the other commented on the original novel and its relationship with the novel’s author).
73
482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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74

dom.” Elsmere argued that SNL did not use the song to parody the
song itself, but rather to comment on New York City’s problems in
75
general. The court determined that “the issue to be resolved by a
court is whether the use in question is a valid satire or parody, and
76
not whether it is a parody of the copied song itself.”
Similarly, in M.C.A., Inc. v. Wilson, the Second Circuit found that
“a permissible parody need not be directed solely to the copyrighted
song but may also reflect on life in general. However, if the copyrighted song is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no
77
need to conjure it up.” Further, in Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., the Southern District of New York addressed a claim
that the defendant’s creation of a song entitled “I Need a Jew” infringed on the plaintiff’s copyright of the song “When You Wish upon
78
a Star.” The plaintiff claimed that the use constituted copyright infringement because the song “I Need a Jew” did not parody the song
“When You Wish upon a Star,” but rather commented on racism and
79
bigotry in general. The court held that “[t]he song can be ‘reasonably perceived’ to be commenting that any categorical view of a race
80
of people is childish and simplistic, just like wishing upon a star.” In
addition, the court said that the defendants “were clearly attempting
to comment in some way on the wishful, hopeful scene in Pinocchio
81
with which the song is associated.” In contrast, in Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc., the court
held that “[t]he concept or form of parody which justifies protection
under the copyright law, and exemption from liability for infringement, consists of an original expression which has social value by

74

Id. at 744.
Id. at 745. Although this case was decided more than a decade before Campbell,
Campbell explained that “[a] parody that more loosely targets an original than the
parody presented here may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come
within our analysis of parody.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581
n.14 (1994). This footnote leaves the door open for courts to weigh more or less
heavily whether the parody comments on the original or on another issue depending
on whether the other fair use factors tip for or against fair use. Id. For this reason,
Elsmere and similar decisions are still cited by courts agreeing with this proposition.
See, e.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
76
Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. at 746.
77
677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981).
78
602 F. Supp. 2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
79
Id. at 506.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 507 (italics added).
75
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82

commenting upon the work being parodied.” The uncertainty as to
the extent of the legal definition of parody may be the difference between a finding of fair use and a finding of infringement. Those who
choose to comment on society or on a given work through the use of
parody should know the boundaries of this form of expression and
should be aware of the potential future legal battle before the work is
published rather than afterward.
The approach to the fair use factors that a court uses in a given
case often depends upon which mode of expression the derivative
work employs. In cases of literary infringement, courts will excerpt
83
passages from both works and draw qualitative comparisons. When
courts are analyzing musical or other nonliterary works, however,
they will often attempt to assess potential infringement in terms of
84
quantity of material appropriated from an original. A quantitative
analysis is more objective and poses less of a risk of “judicial manipulation” of the fair use factors than does a subjective qualitative analysis. For this reason, the First Amendment rights of literary parodists
are put in a more perilous position than those of their musical or
even visual counterparts. This is most evident when courts use injunctive relief in cases of literary parody.
III. DISTRICT COURTS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Many scholars believe that issuing preliminary injunctions in
copyright cases implicates concerns of prior restraint of an author’s
85
First Amendment rights. As Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh have
noted, “[p]reliminary injunctions in copyright cases—and in certain
other types of intellectual property cases—are at least as troublesome
as preliminary injunctions in obscenity or libel cases. We believe that
under the Court’s prior restraint jurisprudence many intellectual
82
No. C79-1766A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15976 at *4–5 (N.D. Ga. August 26,
1981).
83
See infra Parts IV, V.
84
See Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., No.
C 07-6076 SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60545, at *19–21 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (discussing the amount of time appropriated from a radio program for a commentary on
the program’s message and determining that the amount of time taken was reasonably necessary to the commentary); see also Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F.
Supp. 2d 310, 325–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the fact that because fifteen
seconds of a song were used in a movie, the “amount and substantiality” factor tipped
in favor of defendant).
85
See, e.g., Trunko, supra note 17, at 1942 (“First amendment issues arise in copyright cases because enjoining publication of a book upon finding infringement may
abridge the alleged infringer’s right to freedom of speech. Yet prior restraints in the
form of injunctions are routinely available in copyright cases.”).
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property preliminary injunctions are therefore unconstitutional.”
This is true especially in light of the fact that artists and authors filing
copyright-infringement suits may seek a variety of relief, including injunctions, impoundments, damages or profits, and costs and attorney
87
fees. Under 17 U.S.C. § 502, a court with jurisdiction to hear copyright actions has the ability to grant injunctive relief “on such terms
as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
88
copyright.” Plaintiffs in copyright-infringement suits tend to favor
injunctive relief because it prevents infringers of the copyright from
further marketing and distributing a work or a product that interferes
89
with the economic viability of the original. Injunctive relief, however, may serve to repress elements of original expression found alongside “infringing” material in a given work, which presents the prob90
lem of restraint of free speech.
Although courts dealing with other substantive issues will generally apply a four-factor test to establish whether injunctive relief is appropriate in a given case, these courts tend to treat plaintiffs in copy91
right cases more favorably and ease the standard. In non-copyright
cases, courts will address (1) whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if
the injunction is not granted; (3) whether the balance of hardships
tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) whether granting the injunction
92
would be in the public interest. In copyright-infringement cases,
86

Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 241 (1998).
87
17 U.S.C. § 502–505 (2006).
88
§ 502(a).
89
See Andrew F. Spillane, Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Cases, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 257, 283–85 (2011).
90
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). In
Campbell, the Supreme Court noted that
[b]ecause the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also wish to bear in mind that
the goals of the copyright law, “to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,” . . . are not always best served by automatically
granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone
beyond the bounds of fair use.
Id. (quoting Leval, supra note 31, at 1132); see also Trunko, supra note 17, at 1950
(“Courts tend to suspect that quotation is stealing and that moral opprobrium attaches to the act of derivative use, forgetting that all intellectual activity is in part derivative and that certain intellectual endeavors such as criticism or history are explicitly referential.”).
91
See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 86, at 158.
92
Id.
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however, this factor analysis often collapses into a discussion of the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, because irreparable
93
harm to the original author is presumed. In fact, all circuits except
the Fifth Circuit “hold that when a plaintiff in a copyright case demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits . . . the district court
94
must presume that the remedies at law would be inadequate.”
Although the readiness to issue preliminary injunctions does not
conflict with First Amendment free speech issues in cases of outright
piracy of an original work, this partiality may prove problematic in
other cases because parties will often bring copyright-infringement
95
claims against works that do have significant transformative value.
Further, whether the creator of a derivative work will be successful in
an asserted fair use defense “depends on widely varying perceptions
96
held by different judges.” In many copyright cases in which a court
awards a party injunctive relief, “the copyright owner’s interest may
be adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever in97
fringement is found.” In the context of unauthorized literary sequels, district courts seem to end up analyzing the merit of the sequel, or the quality of the writing, instead of determining how the
sequel may affect the copyright-holder’s rights to his or her original
98
or to derivatives of the original. Two recent district court cases involving such literary sequels, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Compa99
100
ny and Salinger v. Colting, serve to illustrate this tendency.

93

See Country Kids ‘N City Slicks v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he prevailing view in cases of copyright infringement [is] that a showing of likelihood of success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm.”); Lemley
& Volokh, supra note 86, at 159 (“If the copyright owner demonstrates a likelihood of
success, courts are virtually unanimous in dispensing with the need to show irreparable injury.”).
94
H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions
and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (2008); see,
e.g., Cadence Design Sys. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A copyright infringement defendant cannot rebut the presumption of irreparable harm by
showing that money damages are adequate.”).
95
See, for example, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company and Salinger v. Colting, discussed infra in Parts IV and V.
96
Leval, supra note 31, at 1132.
97
Id.
98
See infra Parts IV, V.
99
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
100
641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
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IV. SUNTRUST BANK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
Plaintiff Suntrust Bank filed suit against Houghton Mifflin Company and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant
from distributing The Wind Done Gone by Alice Randall (“Randall’s
novel”), a sequel to Gone with the Wind (“GWTW”) that the plaintiff
101
claimed interfered with its copyright.
Randall’s novel retells the
story of GWTW from the point of view of Cynara, a slave and the
102
The defendant
daughter of Mammy, a character in GWTW.
claimed that the reason for the direct, explicit, and repeated references to GWTW was to critique GWTW’s negative depiction of Afri103
The court began its analysis by emphasizing that,
can-Americans.
under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), authors of original works have the exclu104
sive right to create derivative works. Furthermore, the plaintiff had
already created several sequels to the original novel; the plaintiff
therefore argued that further publication and distribution of Ran105
dall’s novel would ultimately destroy the market for these products.
After establishing that Randall’s novel contained “actionable copying,” the court addressed the defendant’s fair use claim and found
that the novel did not constitute a “fair use” of the material taken
106
from GWTW.
To draw this conclusion, the court applied the four
107
fair use factors under § 107. First, the court analyzed the transformative value of Randall’s novel to determine whether “the purpose
108
and character” of the use weighed in favor of a fair use finding.
This determination necessitated that the court analyze how the aspects taken from GWTW were integrated in the new novel and “what
the author attempt[ed] to accomplish by creating her new work
109
through the copying of the original expression of another artist.”
The court eventually conceded that Randall’s novel contained some
parodic elements and was therefore at least a little transformative, but
its overall purpose was not solely to comment on or to criticize the
original, and therefore, the book was viewed as an unauthorized se110
quel. Essentially, the court determined that “the new work does not
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1364.
Id.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1363–64.
Id. at 1386.
See discussion supra accompanying notes 28–39.
Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1377–78.
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make use of a hero, but, rather, takes fifteen main characters, more
fully explains what happened in the previous work, and then tells
111
what happens to them thereafter—a sequel.” The court explained
that because an authorized sequel to GWTW could accomplish the
same effect as Randall’s novel, albeit in a different writing style, Randall’s novel was not sufficiently transformative to be considered fair
112
use.
Next, the district court briefly concluded that because GWTW is
a fictional novel and “is creative, imaginative, and written to gain a financial return for the author’s efforts,” it deserves greater protection
113
under a fair use analysis than would a scholarly work.
Factor two
114
In terms of the third fair use
therefore weighed against fair use.
factor—the amount and substantiality of the work used—the court
found that Randall’s novel used too much material from GWTW to
115
comment on GWTW’s “inaccurate portrait of Southern history.”
The court was not persuaded that Randall’s novel added sufficient
new material and commentary to the original story to qualify for fair
116
use. Specifically, the court remarked that “Ms. Randall’s use cannot
receive the benefit of the fair use defense because she uses far more
117
of the original than necessary.”
In making this determination,
however, the court did not define what amount would be “necessary”
in order to make Randall’s point. Instead, the court noted that Randall’s novel “could have copied significantly less of the memorable
parts of the original” and would have been able to qualify for fair use
118
as a parody.
Finally, the court assessed the fourth factor, the effect of the use
on the market value of the original. In this analysis, the court emphasized that it needed to address “not only . . . the extent of the new
work’s potential market harm to the earlier work but also . . . the ef119
fect that would occur if that type of use became widespread.”
Although the transformative elements made the market effect on the
original difficult to determine, the court found that Randall’s novel
would ultimately interfere with the copyright-holder’s market for de111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
Id. at 1380–81.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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rivative works, and therefore this factor tipped against fair use. The
court totaled its findings for all four factors to determine that the
plaintiff had a cognizable copyright infringement claim and that the
defendant’s asserted fair use defense would fail; the court thus
121
granted the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s find122
The
ing that Randall’s novel infringed upon GWTW’s copyright.
Eleventh Circuit focused its analysis on whether or not the injunction
was the appropriate form of relief in this case, but in order to do so, it
needed to analyze both the merit of the copyright infringement claim
123
as well as the defendant’s fair use defense. In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the history of copyright and focused on its
protection of learning, the public domain, and the exclusive rights of
124
the author that it provides.
The court addressed each of the fair
use factors as applied to Randall’s novel and found that factors one,
125
three, and four arguably tipped in favor of fair use. In drawing its
conclusion, the court noted that “the issuance of the injunction was
at odds with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior restraint on speech because the public
had not had access to Randall’s ideas or viewpoint in the form of ex126
pression that she chose.” Compared to the district court’s opinion,
which dismissed Randall’s First Amendment claim in one paragraph,
the Eleventh Circuit more readily recognized the need to analyze fair
use in literary parodies through the First Amendment lens, which ultimately tipped the balance in favor of finding fair use.
V. SALINGER V. COLTING
In Salinger v. Colting, plaintiff J.D. Salinger filed a complaint
against defendant Fredrik Colting, alleging copyright infringement
and common law unfair competition; Salinger claimed that Colting’s
novel, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye (“60 Years”), is derivative
127
In response, Colting arof his novel Catcher in the Rye (“Catcher”).
120

Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1384–86.
122
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
123
Id. at 1260.
124
Id. at 1261–62.
125
Id. at 1271–76.
126
Id. at 1277.
127
641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2010).
121
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gued that even if his novel otherwise infringed upon Salinger’s copy128
right, the novel qualified for the fair use defense. In determining
whether to award Salinger a preliminary injunction to prevent Colting from publishing 60 Years in the United States, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York applied the four fair use
factors by comparing the material found in 60 Years with that of
129
Catcher. To assess the “purpose and character of the use,” the court
looked to the work’s transformative quality and determined whether
the new work “merely supersede[s] the objects of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
130
message . . . .” The court said that a transformative use “is not strictly required,” but can help guide the court in its evaluation of whether
131
or not a work “advances knowledge and the progress of the arts.”
The court first analyzed whether 60 Years qualifies as a parody,
132
“which may claim fair use under § 107.”
The court also clarified
that precedent had established that the parody characterization only
extends to the elements of the work that criticize or comment on the
133
original work rather than the author of the original work himself.
The court ultimately distinguished Suntrust by noting that 60 Years
“contains no reasonably discernable rejoinder or specific criticism of
any character or theme of Catcher,” which made it difficult to classify
134
as a parody. In its analysis of the parodic qualities of 60 Years, the
court excerpted long passages from both Catcher and 60 Years and attempted to compare the language and themes of the novels to determine if substantial similarities existed between the two.
The court first analyzed the character of Holden Caulfield and
135
Much of the court’s language in
compared it to Colting’s Mr. C.
this analysis indicates that to reach a conclusion, the court must act as
136
a literary critic or at least engage in some form of literary analysis.
For example, the court pulled an entire paragraph of quotes from
Catcher to present a general overview of Salinger’s Holden Caulfield
128

17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4) (2006).
Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
130
Id. at 256 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 257.
134
Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d. at 258.
135
Id.
136
See id. at 258–60.
129
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137

character. Following these quotes, the court explained, “to the extent Colting and Defense experts contend that 60 Years is attempting
to accentuate how Holden’s emotional growth would ultimately be
stunted by his unwillingness to compromise his principles or engage
with ‘the phonies,’ they were again simply rehashing one of the criti138
cal extant themes of Catcher.”
Despite the fact that Colting explained his attempted comment on Catcher, the court instead interpreted 60 Years to merely reiterate the same themes Salinger had
139
expounded upon years earlier.
The court then commented that while analyzing creative works,
it should not rationalize all commercial derivative works as “post hoc”
140
parodies.
In a footnote, the court also noted that until the litigation began, Colting never asserted that 60 Years was to be construed
as a parody or critique; rather, he characterized the book as a sequel
141
The court then addressed Colting’s argument that the
to Catcher.
inclusion of Salinger as a character in the novel was sufficiently trans142
formative to qualify 60 Years as a parody.
The court did concede
that using Salinger as a character in the novel was original, but held
that a parody of a literary novel must comment on the work itself, not
143
use the work to comment on something else, such as the author.
Further, the court explained that even if the Salinger character contains transformative qualities, Colting included this character in the
novel not to further a critique of the novel, but rather to comment on
144
Salinger and “his supposed idiosyncrasies.”

137

Id. at 258–59. Following this overview, the court noted that “it can be argued
that the contrast between Holden’s authentic but critical and rebellious nature and
his tendency toward depressive alienation is one of the key themes of Catcher.” Id. at
259. By making this statement, the court was interpreting the original novel in order
to assess Colting’s novel in light of this interpretation, which seems to be a form of
literary analysis and comparison.
138
Id. at 259–60.
139
In fact, the court later commented, “60 Years’ plain purpose is not to expose
Holden Caulfield’s disconnectedness, absurdity, and ridiculousness, but rather to satisfy Holden’s fans’ passion for Holden Caulfield’s disconnectedness, absurdity, and
ridiculousness, which Catcher has ‘elevated into the realm of protectable creative expression.’” Id. (quoting Castle Rock Ent. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 143
(2d Cir. 1998)).
140
Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
141
Id. at 260 n.3.
142
Id. at 262.
143
Id. at 261. But see Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[T]he issue to be resolved by a court is whether the use in question
is a valid satire or parody, and not whether it is a parody of the copied song itself.”).
144
Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 262.
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After analyzing whether 60 Years contained sufficient transformative elements and concluding that it did not, the court then addressed the other fair use factors, and determined that they also
145
“weigh[ed] against a finding of fair use.”
The district court held
that because 60 Years was to be sold for profit, the commercial nature
146
of the novel automatically weighed against finding fair use. Similarly, in discussing the “nature of the copyrighted work,” the court explained that it accords more leeway to a fair use claim when the work
147
is “factual or informational” rather than “expressive or creative.”
The court implied that because Colting chose to write a novel, fair
148
use would be more difficult to establish. The court determined that
in terms of the “amount and substantiality of the portion used,” Colting took “well more from Catcher, in both substance and style, than is
necessary for the alleged transformative purpose of criticizing Salin149
ger and his attitudes and behavior.” In this analysis, the court again
drew on particular language and excerpts from both novels to estab150
Echoing language used in the
lish that Colting crossed the line.
Suntrust district court opinion, the court in Salinger held that
“[d]efendants have taken much more from Salinger’s copyrighted
151
works than is necessary to serve their alleged critical purpose,” but
did not give any guidance as to how much material would be “necessary” to achieve that purpose.
Finally, the district court determined that because it had previously characterized the novel as a sequel to Catcher, 60 Years falls
within the purview of Salinger’s exclusive right to create derivative
works and therefore interfered with the market for such derivative
152
works. Because this novel may affect Salinger’s creation of a sequel
to Catcher, the court held that this factor also weighed against fair
153
use.
At the end of the opinion, the court briefly addressed the standard for injunctions. After reaching its conclusion that Salinger established a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the court determined that “irreparable harm may be presumed,” and granted
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 268.
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154

Salinger the injunction.
Colting appealed the decision, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and
155
remanded the district court’s judgment.
One of the major issues
on appeal was the appropriateness of the district court’s issuance of
156
an injunction.
Several amicus curiae briefs were filed, and the focus of the briefs was largely on the First Amendment guarantee of
157
Notable organizations such as the American Lifree expression.
brary Association used their briefs to emphasize the important First
Amendment ramifications of the district court’s decision to issue the
158
injunction, which indicated that this subject would become an important issue in the Second Circuit’s decision. Ultimately, the court
found that the preliminary injunction standard applied by the district
court, which presumed irreparable harm once a copyright plaintiff
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, was partly abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in eBay, Inc. v. MercEx159
change, L.L.C.
Although the eBay decision related to permanent injunctions in
the patent context, the Second Circuit determined that eBay’s holding also applies in the context of preliminary injunctions in copyright
160
actions. In eBay, the Supreme Court determined that principles of
equity require plaintiffs to satisfy a four-part test before being granted
injunctive relief:
(1) that [plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
161
be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Because the district court in Salinger did not consider all of these factors in issuing its preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit re154

Id. at 269.
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
156
Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 25, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2010) (No. 09-2878); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 20, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68
(2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878).
157
See Brief of Am. Library Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting DefendantAppellants at 3, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878) [hereinafter Brief of American Library Association], available at http://www.arl.org/
bm~doc/salingeramicusbrief.pdf.
158
Id.
159
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 76 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006)).
160
Id. at 77–78.
161
eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.
155
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manded the case to the district court to reassess whether an injunc162
tion would be appropriate under these circumstances.
Unlike the
Eleventh Circuit in Suntrust, the Second Circuit did not analyze the
substance of Colting’s fair use defense. Rather, in one paragraph, the
Second Circuit determined that the district court’s finding that Colting would not succeed in his defense was not clear error, and there163
fore would not be disturbed.
On remand, the parties entered a
confidential settlement agreement, which resulted in a permanent
injunction forbidding Colting “from manufacturing, publishing, distributing, shipping, advertising, promoting, selling, or otherwise disseminating any copy of the book 60 Years Later . . . in or to the United
164
States.” The result in Salinger, perhaps more than the result in Suntrust, demonstrates the importance of district court opinions in this
context, and highlights the uncertainty literary parodists face.
District courts must often walk a fine line between protecting the
economic interests of authors of fictional novels and protecting the
First Amendment interests of authors of parodies or sequels. Although cases of unauthorized literary sequels are not litigated frequently, they do illustrate the difficulty district courts face in applying
the fair use factors to this form of expression. Further, a possibility
exists “that the risk of being held an infringer is deterring rewritings
of texts that are still copyrighted and is steering authors to set their
165
revisionary sights instead on public domain works.”
Allowing the
potential for litigation to deter creation produces a result irreconcilable with one of the goals Congress envisioned in codifying the Copyright Act.
Both Suntrust and Salinger demonstrate the difficulty that district
courts face when confronted with the problem of fair use in parodic
sequels. Because of the uncertainty in how a court will apply the factors in a given case, creators of parodic literary sequels may think
twice before devoting the time and effort to a project that readers
may never see. Ultimately, decisions such as Suntrust and Salinger may
serve to chill the creation of such parodies or commentaries, which
thwarts Congress’s intention to promote artistic endeavors by enact166
ing the Copyright Act. The frequently subjective nature of the fair
use factors gives district courts the ability to tailor the analysis to the
162

Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.
Id. at 83.
164
Judgment on Consent at 1, Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (No. 09 Civ. 5095).
165
Note, Originality, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1994 (2002).
166
See, e.g., Warnken Van Hecke, supra note 71.
163
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particular case at issue. But this subjectivity also gives district courts
tremendous discretion to determine whether an author has fairly
used material to create a parody or whether he or she should be held
liable for copyright infringement. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “The law grants copyright holders a powerful monopoly in
their expressive works. It should not also afford them windfall damages for the publication of the sorts of works that they themselves
would never publish, or worse, grant them a power of indirect cen167
sorship.” District court judges are not literary critics. Yet a careful
reading of both Suntrust and Salinger demonstrates the ease with
which a reasoned application of the fair use factors can lead to an assessment of the quality of the literary work being analyzed. Not all
cases will make their way to the circuit courts. While defendants in
cases like Suntrust may have the merits of their cases reassessed on
168
Further, even
appeal, not all defendants have this opportunity.
those who do make their way to the circuit courts do so only after
lengthy, expensive litigation for a final result that is far from cer169
tain. Rather than relying on circuit courts to resolve the discrepancies among the district courts, the problem should be resolved at the
district court level.
VI. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
To more adequately protect the First Amendment rights of parodist-authors while still protecting the economic rights of original
authors, district courts should implement three distinct, yet interconnected, changes to the fair use analysis. First, the analysis of a literary parody should begin with a presumption of fair use, which
would shift the burden to the original author to disprove fair use in
cases of parody. Second, district courts should standardize their application of the fair use factors by focusing their analysis on fair use
factor four—the market effect of derivative works on the original.
Finally, before issuing injunctive relief in cases of literary parody, dis-

167

Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001).
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that on appeal, the Salinger court opted
not to interfere with the district court’s fair use analysis. See Salinger v. Colting, 607
F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
169
Litigating copyright issues may also be more costly than bringing many other
types of suits because of the possibility for fee-shifting and attorney’s fees allowed by
the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). “In any civil action under this title,
the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party
other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by
this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party
as part of the costs.” Id.
168
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trict courts should engage in a more stringent analysis of the effects
of allowing the parody to be distributed; this more stringent test
would ensure that parodist-authors’ free speech rights are not being
unduly restrained.
A. Presumption of Fair Use
A presumption of fair use in cases of parody furthers the original
goals of copyright law while still serving to protect the First Amendment rights of parodists. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in its Suntrust
decision, the three main goals of copyright law are (1) the promotion
of learning, (2) the protection of the public domain, and (3) the
170
granting of an exclusive right to the author.
The court explained
that copyright law promotes learning by “guarding against censor171
Similarly, the
ship” and encouraging the dissemination of ideas.
protection of the public domain ensures that the public will eventually have access to and will be able to use others’ creations in novel and
172
important ways, while allowing an author a copyright over a work
gives the author a right to exclusively use the work for a limited pe173
riod of time.
Presuming fair use in cases of parody protects all of
these goals while still ensuring the protection of others’ First
Amendment rights.
One argument against the current statutory treatment of copyright is the term for which the author or artist owns the right. Copyrights were originally intended to be limited economic monopolies,
but owners of copyrights are now given these monopolies for a fairly
extensive period of time. The first Copyright Act (of 1790) used the
Statute of Anne’s fourteen-year copyright period and allowed for
174
another fourteen-year renewal.
By contrast, the Copyright Act of
1976 extended the copyright period to the life of the author plus fifty
175
years. Congress further extended the period in 1998 to the life of

170

Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1261–62.
Id. at 1261.
172
Id. at 1262.
173
Id. at 1262–63.
174
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/history/1790act.pdf (“[T]he author and authors of any
map, chart, book or books already printed within these United States . . . shall have
the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such map,
chart, book or books, for the term of fourteen years from the recording the title thereof in the clerk’s office . . . .”).
175
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
171
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176

the author plus seventy years. Presuming fair use in cases of parody
can alleviate the free speech impediments put in place by the lengthy
term of ownership. Essentially, rather than requiring a creator of a
transformative derivative work to assert “fair use” as a defense, a copy177
right owner would be required to disprove fair use.
This presents
less of a burden to creators of transformative works and furthers the
178
intention that copyright be a limited economic right.
Although
some court decisions have emphasized that a finding of parody
179
should not be construed as presumptive fair use, such a determination would eliminate much of the subjective analysis courts currently
engage in when assessing how much use is “fair.” Some scholars have
even gone so far as to advocate a presumption of fair use in all cases
180
of transformation.
Similarly, presumptive fair use for parodies furthers the intention of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause that copyright “pro181
mote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” or as the Eleventh
182
Circuit explained, encourages protection of the public domain.
Copyright-holders are still given the economic incentive to produce
original, creative works because they can still obtain copyrights over
their novels, bring suit against those who have infringed on their
originals, and choose to award licenses to and be paid by those who
want to use their original material. Allowing parodists the privilege
of a presumption of fair use, however, will also serve to promote
176

Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (2006) (amending the duration of copyright period)); see also Murphy, supra note 15, at 572.
177
See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1271, 1311 (2008); Maureen McCrann, Note, A Modest Proposal: Granting Presumptive
Fair Use for Musical Parodies, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 96, 101–02 (2009).
178
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store
of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”).
179
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994) (“Like a book
review quoting the copyrighted material criticized, parody may or may not be fair
use, and petitioners’ suggestion that any parodic use is presumptively fair has no
more justification in law or fact than the equally hopeful claim that any use for news
reporting should be presumed fair.”); Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The fact that parody by definition must borrow elements from an existing work, however, does not mean that every parody is shielded
from a claim of copyright infringement as a fair use.”).
180
See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 177, at 1311 (“Put another way, in cases involving
transformative uses, the cost of fair use false positives is less than the cost of false
negatives, insofar as the latter threaten to undermine important free-speech values.”).
181
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
182
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).
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progress in the arts by conveying some measure of stability to parodists seeking to legitimately contribute critical commentary of the original. By presuming that parodies entail fair use, courts will no longer
easily engage in ad hoc decision-making; it will be more difficult to
manipulate the classification of whether or not a given work consti183
tutes parody in order to reach a finding of infringement or fair use.
For this reason, a presumption of fair use will further another of copyright’s intended goals: stimulating public debate with creative ex184
pression.
Presumptive fair use also serves to promote learning and more
fully protect a parodist’s First Amendment rights. One important
function of the First Amendment is to allow citizens to contribute to
185
the “marketplace of ideas.” Presuming fair use in the case of paro186
dies solves the potential problem of stifled public debate. Parodies
are particularly vulnerable to censorship because those being parodied have the ability to do the censoring. Because parodies often criticize or comment negatively on the original work, authors are not
187
likely to approve the use of their original material.
Even criticism
183

See Paul Tager Lehr, Note, The Fair-Use Doctrine Before and After “Pretty Woman’s”
Unworkable Framework: The Adjustable Tool for Censoring Distasteful Parody, 46 FLA. L. REV.
443, 460 (1994) (“While the Copyright Act is content neutral, the cases reveal that
courts have used the discretion inherent in the fair-use framework to deny protection
to sexually explicit or distasteful parodies.”).
184
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
The ‘promotion of science and the useful arts’ requires this limit on
the scope of an author’s control. Were an author able to prevent subsequent authors from using concepts, ideas, or facts contained in his or
her work, the creative process would wither and scholars would be
forced into unproductive replication of the research of their predecessors. This limitation on copyright also ensures consonance with our
most important First Amendment values.
Id. (citation omitted).
185
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“By
protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government attack,
the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information.”).
186
See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kosinski, C.J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment isn’t just about religion or politics—
it’s also about protecting the free development of our national culture. Parody, humor, irreverence are all vital components of the marketplace of ideas.”).
187
See Geri J. Yonover, Artistic Parody: The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody,
and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 103–04 (1996).
To obtain permission from an artist who may assert personal, moral
rights would seem to be virtually impossible. Further, we may well
wonder how parody could function effectively as commentary and critique if the authority to satirize, criticize, ridicule, or jibe is given.
Permission connotes approval—few parodists wish that blessing, and
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or negative commentary, however, contributes to the public debate
and allows the parodist to express himself or herself creatively. As
one scholar notes, “With the recent copyright term extension, one
wonders how many more canonical works will be shielded by long
copyright terms, and how many rewritings will not be produced be188
cause authors cannot get permission to create them.” By the time
the copyright period has expired and the original passes into the
public domain, relevant commentary or critique may also have expired. Parodists should not be discriminated against because of the
form of critique they have chosen to use; censorship of critical com189
mentary in scholarly journals or news articles is not so prevalent.
“Fair use, therefore, provides a valuable right to those compelled to
challenge a prior work—the right to make reasonable use of the work
190
in their criticism.”
Presuming fair use in cases of parody, perhaps along with allowing works to enter the public domain more quickly by reducing the
statutory period of copyright protection, will ultimately benefit wouldbe parodists. As scholars have noted, “[T]he public domain provides
the building blocks from which individuals can construct their own
speech. But as the scope of intellectual property expands, the scope
191
of available speech diminishes.”
Granting a presumption of fair
use, however, does not completely solve the problem of inconsistent
application of the fair use factors. A presumption of fair use does not
equate to automatic determination of fair use; courts will still be required to analyze the transformed work in the context of the fair use
factors when the copyright-holder attempts to rebut the presump-

few artists whose moral rights of integrity are at risk would wish that
curse.
Id.
188

Note, Originality, supra note 165, at 1994.
See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
A key distinction that has emerged in the decisions evaluating the
second factor [of fair use] is whether the work is expressive or creative,
such as a work of fiction, or more factual, with a greater leeway being
allowed to a claim of fair use where the work is factual or informational.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
190
Jeffrey D. Grossett, Comment, The Wind Done Gone: Transforming Tara into a
Plantation Parody, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2002).
191
John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1208 (2005).
189
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192

tion. Thus, although a presumption of fair use might help to alleviate the problem, it does not completely resolve it.
B. Standardization of Factor Application
If parodies were presumed to be fair use, a copyright-holder
would have the burden of demonstrating why the use was actually an
infringement. In their analyses of these arguments, courts would
then be required to engage in traditional fair use analysis by applying
the statute’s four factors. To remedy the confusion and uncertainty
associated with application of the fair use factors, however, district
courts should instead use more clear-cut, bright-line rules in their
application of the factors. One possibility for how courts may achieve
a more definitive, predictable result is to collapse the factor analysis
into a discussion of how a derivative work affects the market for the
original or the market for derivative works created or authorized by
the original author—fair use factor four. Collapsing the four-factor
test into one factor eliminates much of the subjective analysis that
makes court determinations of fair use so unpredictable, but it also
still promotes the three major goals of copyright law as discussed by
the Eleventh Circuit in Suntrust.
Because copyright law in the United States is largely concerned
with providing an author or artist with a limited economic monopoly
over his or her creation, analyzing the market effects of a derivative
193
work seems like a logical starting place. If a derivative work is likely
to serve the same market as an original and may be viewed as a market substitute for that original, a fair use defense will likely fail; arguably, one major goal of copyright law is to prevent such direct encroachment upon an author’s market for his work. Thus, relying
solely on the market factor adequately protects authors’ economic interests, one of the major purposes of copyright.
Some scholars see this market-based test as a way to analyze more
objectively the extent of transformation in a derivative work com194
pared to the original.
When two works are substantially similar,
they are likely to serve similar markets and act as substitutes for one
another. If the works are serving different markets, the derivative
work is more likely transformative in character. “Thus, the market
analysis balances incentives for authors to create against the public’s
192

See Andrew S. Long, Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing Copyright to Promote the First Amendment Values of Transformative Video, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 317,
363 (2007).
193
See Topper Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 250.
194
See, e.g., Warnken Van Hecke, supra note 71, at 494.
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195

desire for intellectual enrichment.”
In cases of parody, the new
work is unlikely to serve the same market as the original because the
works effectively have different goals. Even in situations in which the
market for an original and the market for a parody are the same, the
parody is unlikely to become a market substitute for the original. In
other words, people will not likely opt to purchase a parody over the
196
original work.
Therefore, relying on an analysis of the economic
effect of a derivative work on the original will also serve the two other
goals of copyright—promoting learning and protecting the public
domain.
C. A More Stringent Test for Administering Injunctive Relief
A major point of contention for defendants in copyright infringement suits is the standard for injunctive relief applied by the
district court. In Salinger, briefs written in support of the defendant’s
appeal emphasize the short shrift given to the defendant’s First
Amendment rights and the presumption of irreparable harm applied
197
to the plaintiff.
Applying a more stringent test for issuing injunctions in copyright suits involving parodies, more specifically in cases
of parodic literary sequels, would also serve to protect the three fundamental goals of copyright that the Eleventh Circuit highlighted in
Suntrust: the promotion of learning, the protection of the public do198
main, and the protection of the exclusive rights of the author.
Employing a stricter standard for issuing injunctions serves to
promote learning by permitting a greater number of transformative,
creative works to be shared and discussed. This ultimately prevents
“censorship” by requiring district courts to thoroughly consider how
injunctive relief for a copyright-holder may affect a parodist’s contribution to the public debate. In awarding injunctive relief to bar publication and distribution of an allegedly infringing work, courts
should also consider the extent to which the public has the right to
receive the information contained in the work or the work’s message.
195

Topper Gonzales, supra note 4, at 251.
One could argue that the creation of a parody might actually bolster the market
for the original; especially in cases of literary parodies, a reader might have difficulty
understanding the parody if he or she had not read the original already, which may
cause the audience to go out and purchase the original novel.
197
See Brief of Public Citizen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting DefendantAppellants at 14, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-7878), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Public%20Citizen%27s%20Amicus
%20Brief.pdf; Brief of American Library Association, supra note 157, at 1–3.
198
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261–62 (11th Cir.
2001).
196
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One fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act is to further the public welfare; situations may exist in which the public welfare would be
furthered by allowing a work to be published rather than hidden
from public view forever—or at least until the copyright period ex199
pires.
Raising the bar for injunctions helps protect the public domain by allowing works with a unique message or comment to be
available for public response. As Colting noted in his brief to the
Second Circuit, the public should be able to decide whether a message is worthwhile rather than let the message be preemptively
200
shielded by a court’s injunction.
Raising the standard for injunctive relief in cases of parody also
does not conflict with copyright’s goal of protecting the rights of an
original author. In some circumstances, especially in cases in which a
parody becomes a market substitute for an original or contains outright piracy, injunctive relief may be appropriate to best protect the
original author’s economic claim to his creation. In most cases of parody, however, an original author will not suffer “irreparable harm”
by a district court’s decision not to issue an injunction, so such irre201
parable harm should not be presumed.
Requiring district courts
analyzing parody cases to assess the balance of hardships and the impact of an injunction on the public interest will also ensure that in
addition to taking into consideration economic harm caused to the
original author, the courts consider the effect of this remedy on others involved. Further, in some situations, monetary damages, rather
than preventing the publication of a transformative comment on the

199
200

See Oakes, supra note 89, at 989–91.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 156, at 32.
The District Court did not even consider the harm to the public in being denied the opportunity to read [60 Years] and to decide for themselves whether Colting’s work adds to or alters their understanding of
[Catcher], Holden and Salinger. The harm to the public’s right to receive information, and even entertainment, is perhaps the most compelling factor in weighing the balance of interests in a case of prior restraint.

Id.
201

See, e.g., id. at 30–31.
On the first prong, absent the presumption, there is no evidence in the
record that Plaintiff will suffer any harm whatsoever, much less irreparable harm, from the publication of [60 Years]. Plaintiff’s representatives admit that Salinger has not written a sequel, and will never permit
one either. But even if Salinger were to change his mind, there is no
evidence in the record that the market for an authorized sequel, a motion picture based on [Catcher] or any other authorized derivative work
would be harmed in the slightest by Colting’s commentary.
Id. (citation omitted).
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original, can better protect an original author’s rights over his
202
work. In such situations, monetary damages, rather than injunctive
relief, should be awarded.
The district court decision in Salinger highlights the danger in
easing the standard for injunctive relief in copyright infringement
cases. The court devotes one paragraph to discussing the presumed
irreparable harm that J.D. Salinger would face if 60 Years were allowed to be published in the United States. The court does not even
mention the balance of equities or potential harm to the public interest; perhaps if the district court had weighed these factors more
203
closely, the outcome would have been different.
Regardless of
whether the outcome of the case would be different, requiring district courts to assess the other balancing factors before issuing injunctions would ensure that authors of unauthorized literary sequels have
their original, transformative expression protected and that the public is not deprived of a valuable critique or commentary. District
courts are guided by the standard for injunctive relief used in their
respective circuits. In cases of copyright infringement, different circuits will apply different standards for injunctive relief depending on
whether or not they take a parodist’s First Amendment rights into
204
consideration. This will ultimately cause great variation in the outcomes of parody cases and great uncertainty for parodists.
This uncertainty can be alleviated to a large degree by presuming fair use in cases of parody, limiting subsequent fair use analysis to
the parody’s effect on the market for the original or licensed derivative works, and heightening the standard used to issue preliminary
injunctions in cases of parody. These steps, when taken in conjunction, will more closely bring a court’s fair use analysis into an equitable balance between two viable interests: the economic interests of a
copyright-holder and the First Amendment interests of a literary parodist.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the early days of this country, copyright has been considered a necessary legal protection to safeguard the economic interests of authors and artists. These rights, however, have never been
202
Id. at 31 (“[I]f this Court were to find that Plaintiff has shown harm, such harm
may be remedied by monetary damages and therefore is not irreparable.”).
203
See Brief of American Library Association, supra note 157, at 4.
204
See generally Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.
2001) (highlighting First Amendment concerns in overturning an injunction issued
by the district court); Tehranian, supra note 191, at 1226.
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absolute. Early on, courts recognized that society’s need for free debate should require that some appropriation of another’s work be
considered fair use. Although Congress eventually codified this “fair
use” doctrine, courts retained their authority to use discretion in considering which factors should be important to determine fair use and
how heavily courts should weigh each of those factors.
Parody is one vehicle through which an author has the ability to
fairly use another’s work to make a critical commentary. Authors or
other creators of original works, however, frequently bring copyright
infringement suits against their parodists, claiming that the parodist
appropriated too much of the author’s original creation. Courts are
then required to balance the interests of the two parties, but in doing
so they may be forced to tacitly assess whether or not the parody was
successful in conveying its message or if it was of good quality. Depending on the form the parody took, as in a novel, a piece of visual
art, or a musical work, the court may engage in either a quantitative
or a qualitative analysis to determine whether the use was fair. In
doing so, the court is forced to balance two sets of competing rights:
those of the original creator and those of the parodist.
This balancing act frequently calls into question which rights
should prevail, and the stakes are high for the parties involved. Because copyright holders have a statutory right to request injunctive
relief, a parodist may unfortunately realize that a work he or she had
put time, effort, and money into may no longer be distributed to the
public. This problem is most evident in cases of literary parodies,
where the court, to resolve the dispute before it, is left to parse the
language carefully selected by two authors, trying to determine the
extent of overlap and whether the parody unduly infringes on the
original. The current formulation of the fair use test gives judges this
freedom to weigh these issues, but this flexibility comes at the expense of certainty.
In Justice Story’s words, “No man writes exclusively from his own
thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The
thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what other
men have thought and expressed, although they may be modified,
205
exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.”
The question that must be answered is whether district courts, and courts in
general, are the appropriate bodies to analyze this “genius or reflection.” As is evidenced in both Suntrust and Salinger, one man’s creativity is another man’s copyright infringement. In applying the cur-

205

Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
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rent fair use analysis, courts are put in the unsavory position of analyzing literature; similarly, authors of these unauthorized derivative
novels are put in the unsettling position of devoting time and energy
to an arguably original creation without knowing if it can ever be
published. Although fair use analysis is designed to be flexible in application, this flexibility may ultimately serve to chill the production
of artistic creation it was designed to promote. A combination of a
presumption of fair use in cases of parody, standardization of the fair
use factors based upon the market effect of the derivative, and a
more rigorous standard for issuing injunctive relief in copyright cases
would improve the protection of a parodist-author’s First Amendment rights. Further, the combination of these changes would still
protect the copyright-holder’s economic rights. Instead of being a
complete monopoly over the material, however, the monopoly would
be limited, as originally intended.

